



UMAA
ADVOCACY

A CRISIS IN PAKISTAN

SECURITY REPORT: THE GROUPS CAUSING HAVOC

SECURITY REPORT

CRISIS IN PAKISTAN

MAY 2013

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Pakistan is suffering a major crisis, in which terrorist groups are committing mass events of violence. These attacks are targeted at Pakistan's minorities; for example, Shia Muslims, Christians, Hindus, and Ahmedis. These attacks are growing in scale and in quantity, resulting in nearly a thousand deaths over the past year alone.

This year began as one of the most brutal years for minorities in Pakistan. The Pakistani Government is failing to devise a coherent or unified strategy against mounting intimidation and violence by terrorist groups against religious and ethnic minorities. As senior analysts have pointed out, the United States needs to 'reset' its policy toward Pakistan; the US should work to contain the ambitions of the Pakistan Army, the ISI, and the flourishing syndicate of terror, including groups like the Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ), Sipah e Sahaba (SSP), and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), if it is to achieve any success in its efforts against global terrorism and the war in Afghanistan.

As US-Pakistan relations deteriorate, and Pakistan's continuing domestic crises worsens, there is little to suggest that the Pakistani Government is going correct its course and improve in the foreseeable future. The facts on the ground suggest that none of the power players in the country have altered the fundamentals of their devastating approach to the use of Islamist extremism and terrorism, both for domestic political management and for strategic extension across and beyond Central Asia. Increasing cooperation and outside state patronage among Islamist extremist organizations creates the specter of even greater radicalization and a progressive loss of control by state agencies that have, in the past, 'handled' Islamist terrorism in the region.

The progressive collapse of state structures and institutions of governance, the visible weakening of the Army's stranglehold over the country's affairs, and the increasing accumulation of armed force among non-state actors can only drive Pakistan into greater turmoil in coming years. Combined with rising popular frustrations and anger against arbitrary, repressive, indiscriminate, and often brutal state action against groups seeking justice and redress of real grievances, Pakistan is being pushed further into the embrace of rising anarchy.

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As the US war in Afghanistan approaches a critical juncture, events in both Pakistan and Afghanistan have had a critical bearing on the region. The two countries have been so interconnected in their struggle against terrorism and extremism that any major incident in one country is bound to have its effects on the other. Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, has noted that the US needs to 'reset' its policy toward Pakistan, to contain the ambitions of the Pakistan Army, the ISI, and the flourishing syndicate of terror, including groups like the Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) and Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT), if it is to hope for any success in Afghanistan. Pointing to President Obama's promise to make the Al-Qaida core, or Al-Qaida al Umm (the mother Al-Qaida), his top target if elected, Riedel noted that "[Al-Qaida's] allies and affiliates in Pakistan, by contrast, are under virtually no pressure." He added, "Al-Qaida is on the defensive in Pakistan, but its many allies and affiliates are on the march."

The government in Pakistan is not doing much to stop this. While civilian and security force fatalities increased dramatically, the total deaths have only declined because terrorist and militant deaths decreased. The main reason for this is that the Pakistani government has failed to take any serious actions against the terror groups, and indeed appears to be reducing previous activities to combat terror.

This year began as one of the most brutal years for minorities in Pakistan. On January 10, 2013, more than 117 people were killed and at least 216 were injured in a chain of bombings in Balochistan's provincial capital of Quetta. At around 3:50 pm, a car bomb exploded in a Bacha Khan Chowk, a crowded Quetta food market. A double bombing also hit Quetta later in the day. A suicide bombing took place inside a pool hall at 8:30 pm. Shortly afterwards, a car bomb exploded nearby. The two blasts targeted the minority Hazara Shia population, as the two blasts were in proximity of two Shia mosques. The attacks were claimed by the Lashkar i Jhangvi (an active Pakistani terrorist organization discussed below).

The violence that took place at the beginning of the year drew much criticism to the Pakistani state and its failure in addressing violence towards minorities. According to Ali Dayan Hasan, the Pakistan Director of Human Rights Watch, "Pakistan's Shia community suffered bloody attacks in 2012, and then 2013 began with the single worst atrocity against the Hazara in Pakistan's history. The government needs to show some backbone and act urgently to protect vulnerable communities such as the Hazara, or risk appearing indifferent or even complicit in the mass killing of its own citizens."

As in the past, Islamabad has continuously failed to devise any rational or logical plan to combat the growing violence and discrimination by terrorist groups throughout Pakistan. Paradoxically, Pakistan has pursued a hard line against civilians who protest the security situation in Pakistan, often deploying military forces or aggressive tactics to dissuade protestors. This policy has deepened tensions in many of Pakistan's provinces, resulting in resentment against the government.

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The fact that the United States is providing humanitarian and military aid to Pakistan has not altered or remediated the situation. Many analysts in the US government have noted that while funds have been earmarked for combatting militancy, they have instead been reallocated, sometimes disappearing in a surprising show of corruption. The US State Department requested Congress to approve \$2.4 billion towards allocations for Pakistan for the fiscal year 2013. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), there has been \$20 billion already pumped into Pakistan over the last decade and over a billion dollars had been provided under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill.

Despite the fact that the relationship between the US and Pakistan is bottoming out, and Pakistan's internal problems, observers note that Pakistan has does nearly nothing to improve the situation, and does not foreseeably have any plans to do so. Sadly, Pakistan ranks as twelfth amongst countries approaching state failure, an astonishing number for a nuclear nation. Pakistan has adopted a self-harming approach towards terrorist groups, giving them free reign to not only attack civilians, but to threaten and kill elected officials and security forces with impunity. By politically allying itself with the same groups, the Pakistani Government seems to be locked into a downward spiral and is taking the country down with it. Further evidence of the decline of Pakistan is the mass immigration of the country's intellectuals, wealth, and professionals to other, safer, countries. The few who remain merely do so to build up enough resources to escape at a later date, perhaps to an even wealthier nation than their predecessors.

That the government itself is failing to provide basic services, such as electricity and clean water, is just more evidence that Pakistan is approaching a failed state. The failure of the Pakistani Army to protect its civilians weakens it on a continual basis, and the allegations of election fraud decrease faith in the new government. Only through decisive action can Pakistan recover.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

What is happening in Pakistan?

Pakistan's failure to control growing Islamic extremism within its borders and the region has resulted in a political and security nightmare. In 2011 alone, more than 6,000 individuals, nearly half of whom were civilians, were killed by militants and terrorist attacks.

What is the Pakistani government doing about this?

The Pakistani government is taking little to no action to combat the rise of violence against its own populace. In fact, there was a major decline in militant fatalities over the past two years, while civilian and security deaths dramatically increased. The reason for this is that Pakistani government officials refuse to take terrorism seriously.

What types of attacks are occurring, and who is responsible?

In the first two months of 2013 alone, Pakistan recorded more than two hundred civilian deaths. The types of attacks are typically bombings, sometimes suicide bombings, against places of worship or large markets or community centers in the heart of minority communities. Typically, claims of responsibility are immediately made, and the largest claimant of responsibility is Lashkar i Jhangvi.

The three terrorist groups who are responsible for the overwhelming majority of the violence are Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ), Sipah e Sahaba (SSP), and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In 2012, the country experienced nearly 1,000 incidents of terrorism, including a growing number of suicide bombings. More than 5,000 non-militants were killed in 2012, up from 2011. The attacks occur in each of Pakistan's provinces, however the majority are focused in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) remained the most volatile region, followed by Gilgit-Baltistan, Balochistan, Khyber Pass (KP), Sindh, and Punjab. Targeted killings occur in Pakistan, wherein lists of professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers, and so forth) of minority communities are identified and assassinated. Rather than address the issue, the Pakistani government has allowed average individuals to legally purchase sub-machine guns and AK-47s, many of which are used in these attacks.

Method of killings are varied with drive-by targeted killings, execution-style killings of Shia men travelling in vans and buses, suicide bombings, and bomb and grenade explosions. Attackers have targeted mosques, imambargahs, schools, students and teachers of seminaries, as well as religious gatherings, and often anyone subscribing to a particular sect.

Are there any suicide attacks in Pakistan?

Suicide attacks occur in Pakistan on a regular basis, and at a growing rate. The number of suicide attacks has steadily increased linearly since 2010.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

Is there anything unique about terrorism in Pakistan?

Targeted killings occur in Pakistan, wherein lists of professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other professions) of minority communities are identified and assassinated. These 'Target Killings' are dramatically growing in number, and are having a devastating effect on Pakistani communities throughout the nation. The Pakistani Home Department Report reported, "Target killings still continue in most parts of the country and major reasons behind these are sectarian, demographic changes, easy access to illicit weapons, mistrust among ethnic groups, family enmities and business rivalries." Paradoxically, the Pakistani government has an 'open door' policy for the sales of heavy arms, including sub-machine guns and AK-47s, which are purchased en masse by groups such as Lashkar i Jhangvi, while remaining financially unfeasible for the majority of the victims.

What has the United States said about this situation?

According to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), schools in Pakistan continue to use textbooks that preach intolerance towards non-Muslim religious minorities. A USCIRF report stated that most teachers view non-Muslims as "enemies of Islam." The Commission reviewed more than 100 textbooks from grades 1-10 from Pakistan's four provinces. Indeed, charities from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates financed a network in Pakistan that recruited children as young as eight to wage "holy war." A US diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks noted that Saudi Arabia was widely seen as funding some of Pakistan's hardline religious madrassas (seminaries), which churn out young men eager for "holy war." "At these madrassas, children are denied contact with the outside world and taught sectarian extremism, hatred for non-Muslims, and anti-Western/anti-Pakistan government philosophy," the cable noted. These extremist ideologies are not only targeted at non-Muslims, but also at other sects within Islam that do not conform to extremists' line of thinking. Most notably, the Shia Muslim population in Pakistan has been the target of increased violence and religious intolerance. In the first two months of 2013 alone, more than two hundred deaths have been reported in attacks targeted at Shia Muslim communities.

At a ground level, how is this happening?

There is a hysteria that surrounds Pakistani politics that coupled with an unmistakably radicalized segment of society, has essentially promoted religious extremism and allowed for terrorism to grow unchecked. In November 2011, Pakistan's Federal Ministry of Interior released a list of more than 30 banned terrorist organizations that are currently operating in Pakistan. However, the list included several militant organizations which now operate under new names. Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT), for instance, was included in the list, but its new identity, Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD), was not included. Despite bans, however, the government continues to avoid confrontation with most of these organizations, initiating almost no effective action to remove the groups from power.

Meanwhile, Pakistani Jihadi groups, in consultation with the so called 'Islamic Emirate [of] Afghanistan' (which is the Taliban shadow government run by Mullah Omar, based in Quetta, Pakistan), created the *Shura-e-Muraqba* (Council for Protection) to unify terrorist forces and scale large attacks on Western targets in Afghanistan.

What's the current state of US – Pakistan relations?

Pakistan's alliance with the United States deteriorated rapidly, even as the US announced its decision to withdraw combat forces from Afghanistan by 2014. And while the decision to withdraw forces did nothing for US-Pakistani relations, it further spurred Pakistan-based terrorist groups to escalate their campaigns in Afghanistan.

A number of incidents in 2011 caused US-Pakistani relations to sharply deteriorate. Major disagreements began to surface with the Raymond Davis case, where Pakistan released an American official who was arrested for killing two men in Lahore in the Punjab Province in Pakistan on January 27, 2011. Raymond Davis was released by Pakistani authorities after increased political pressure by the US. Another blow to already edgy relations was dealt on April 25, 2011, when official documents leaked by WikiLeaks disclosed that the US administration had placed Pakistan's external intelligence agency, ISI, on a list of terrorist organizations alongside groups like Al-Qaida. Shortly afterwards, Al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden was killed in a US operation at Abbottabad on May 2, 2011, allegedly without the Pakistani government's knowledge of the raid.

How are US drone Strikes reflecting on relations with Pakistan?

The United States' use of unmanned drones has increased by the Obama Administration in conjunction with its shift from the war in Iraq to Afghanistan. Drones have been used as a method of targeting militants within Pakistan without requiring any US troops to enter the country. There have been approximately 355 drone strikes within Pakistan since 2004, resulting in 2,000 to 3,000 fatalities.

Drone attacks had been stalled late in 2011 in the aftermath of the strong Pakistani resentment over the killing of at least 25 Pakistani soldiers in a cross border attack by NATO Forces on a check post in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. However, the strikes were resumed on January 10, 2012, when missiles fired by US drones killed four suspected militants in the outskirts of the town of Miranshah in the North Waziristan Agency (NWA) of the FATA.

Pakistani civilian and military leaders, who had privately supported US drone attacks in the past, have developed sharp anxieties concerning their use during the course of 2011, and have repeatedly protested against US operations inside Pakistani territory. US-Pakistani relations, consequently, have continued to sour since 2011.

What is the Pakistani media saying?

The media continues to bear the brunt of both state and extremist anger. Journalists and reporters have been the target of increased violence and political instability. The most prominent of such killings took place on May 31, 2011 when Syed Saleem Shahzad, a Pakistani investigative journalist for leading European and Asian media, was found dead near the town of Mandi Bahauddin, about 75 miles south of Islamabad. Reports indicate that he had been 'picked up' by ISI agents before his 'disappearance' and the subsequent discovery of his body, and that he had been tortured before his death. The ISI's involvement in the case is being 'investigated,' though the media and Pakistani analysts are skeptical about such investigation.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

What is the role of Afghanistan in the current situation?

The worsening situation in Afghanistan has not helped US-Pakistan relations. According to a February 29, 2012, US Congressional Research Service report, civilian fatalities in Afghanistan have been increasing every year since 2007, from 1,523 in 2007 to as many as 3,021 in 2011. Media reportage, meanwhile, indicated that Pakistan continued to play a pivotal role in the militant campaigns in Afghanistan. Pakistan also continues to support and encourage militants to continue attacks on ISAF forces. The situation of both countries is so deeply intertwined that a solution in Afghanistan may not be found without addressing the problems festering in Pakistan.

What is the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Increasing border tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan provided terrorist groups in Pakistan the chance to assist their compatriots in securing major sections of the border for the coordination of their terrorist activities. The Pakistani government has impassively observed the situation, but failed to intervene as evidenced by Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani remarks that "Pakistan wants a stable Afghanistan but not at the cost of Pakistan." These remarks suggest that Pakistan will either control any peace initiatives, and manage them in a way that benefits Pakistan, or allow lawlessness to continue.

What has the US done to help?

Efforts from the United States to stabilize the region have been deterred by the Pakistani government's continued refusal to act against terror groups within its own borders. Furthermore, the Haqqani Network, one of the most dangerous and active terrorist groups in Afghanistan, has established major training camps and headquarters in the FATA province of Pakistan. On February 16, 2012, the Chairman of US Senate Committee on Armed Services, Senator Carl Levin, said, "Pakistan's support to the Haqqani Network is a major cause for US-Pakistan relations reaching a low point where they're going to remain until the Pakistan military ends its ties to these extremists carrying out cross-border attacks."

Unfortunately, the links between the Pakistani military and terror groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan remain strong. According to reports, Mullah Omar, the Afghan Taliban leader who suffered a heart attack on January 7, 2011, was reportedly treated for several days in a Karachi hospital with the help of Pakistan's intelligence agency, ISI.

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Geographically, Pakistan can be divided into three regions: the lowlands along the Indus and east, the arid plateau of in the southwest, and the mountains in the north. The provinces of Punjab and Sindh, in south, are well irrigated by the Indus tributaries. The land is fertile and most of Pakistan's food. This area, includes the cities of Karachi, (the capital), Lahore, and Rawalpindi densely-populated in the country.

The southwestern province of Balochistan covers almost half Pakistan's territory. It consists of a stony plateau, sparsely and very dry. Outside of the provincial capital of Quetta, travel in Balochistan is extremely restricted.

Pakistan's mountainous north contains the second tallest peak on Earth, K2 (28,250 ft., 8611 m), and over 300 glaciers. Three great mountain ranges stretch across this part of the country: the Himalayas, the Karakoram and the Hindu Kush. The region's topography is constantly changing, as frequent earthquakes help the mountains grow at the remarkable rate of 7 mm (1/4 inch) a year.

Pakistan's climate varies according to elevation. April through September are the most pleasant months in the mountains, although they bring oppressive heat to the low-lying plains of the Indus Valley, where midday temperatures can exceed 40 degrees C (100 degrees F). December through February are the coolest months, as lowland temperatures drop to between 10-25 degrees Celsius (50-77 degrees Fahrenheit) and the air in the mountains falls below freezing. Monsoons reach the southern areas of the country in late summer, although precipitation is minimal in Balochistan and in the north and limited in most of the interior.



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Balochistan is a province to the south east of Pakistan, bordering Afghanistan to the north, Iran to the west, and the Arabian Sea to the south. The region is dry and is mostly covered with stony plateaus. There are a few densely population areas, but the province is for the most part sparsely populated. Travel in Balochistan outside the city of Quetta has been extremely restricted.

On January 10, 2013, more than 117 people were killed and at least 216 were injured in a chain of bombings in provincial capital of Quetta. At around 3:50 pm, a car bomb exploded in a Bacha

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Khan Chowk, a crowded Quetta food market. The attack was claimed by the United Baloch Army (an active Balochistan separatist organization discussed below).

A double bombing also hit Quetta later in the day. A suicide bombing took place inside a pool hall at 8:30 pm. Shortly afterwards, a car bomb exploded nearby. The two blasts targeted the minority Hazara Shia population, as the two blasts were in proximity of two Shia mosques. The attacks were claimed by the Lashkar i Jhangvi (an active Pakistani terrorist organization discussed below).

The violence that took place at the beginning of the year drew much criticism to the Pakistani state and its failure in addressing violence towards minorities. According to Ali Dayan Hasan, the Pakistan Director of Human Rights Watch, "Pakistan's Shia community suffered bloody attacks in 2012, and then 2013 began with the single worst atrocity against the Hazara in Pakistan's history. The government needs to show some backbone and act urgently to protect vulnerable communities such as the Hazara, or risk appearing indifferent or even complicit in the mass killing of its own citizens."

According to data compiled by the *South Asia Terrorism Portal* (SATP), in 2012, well over 396 members of the Shia population were killed in 113 targeted attacks across Pakistan, of which 152 were killed in Balochistan alone (in 54 incidents). In 2011, 136 Shias were killed in 24 incidents across the country; 88 of them in Balochistan, in 11 such incidents.

Shia persecution across Pakistan and the state's callousness has also been acknowledged by the Supreme Court (SC) in its interim order of October 12, 2012, castigating the Provincial Government for its failure to fulfill its duty to protect life and property, and to establish peace in Balochistan in particular. The Court had directed the Federal Government to ensure public security, and underlined the constitutional responsibilities and respective authority of both the Federal and the Provincial Governments. In a harsh critique of the Government, Balochistan Governor Zulfiqar Magsi, referring to the January 10, 2013, attacks, declared, on January 11, that after "such mayhem and carnage, the Government has no right to rule." On January 13, 2013, the Federal Government announced the imposition of Governor's rule in Balochistan, effective January 14, 2013. Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf invoked Article 234 of the Constitution to promulgate Governor's rule in the Province.

With Sindh and Gilgit Baltistan, Balochistan is the only region in Pakistan which has witnessed a rise in terrorism related fatalities in 2012. The Province witnessed 954 fatalities, including 690 civilians, 178 Security Force (SF) personnel and 86 militants in 418 incidents of killing in 2012, as against 711 fatalities, including of 542 civilians, 122 security force personnel and 47 militants in 294 incidents of killing in 2011, according to partial data compiled by SATP. The first 13 days of 2013 have already recorded 144 fatalities [these numbers are likely to be underestimates, as access to media and independent observers is severely restricted in Balochistan]. While overall fatalities recorded an increase of 34.17 per cent, civilian fatalities rose 27.30 per cent; security forces, 45.9 per cent; and militants, 82.97 per cent.

Since 2004, 222 civilian killings (123 in the South and 99 in the North) have been claimed by Baloch separatist formations such as the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT) and UBA. Islamist extremist formations, primarily the LJ and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), claimed responsibility for the killing of 186 civilians,

all in the North, mostly in sectarian attacks. 1,998 fatalities remain ‘unattributed’ since 2004, 662 in 2012, and 502 in 2011. A large proportion of the ‘unattributed’ fatalities are believed to be the result of enforced disappearances carried out by state agencies, or by their proxies, prominently including the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Aman Balochistan (TNAB, Movement for the Restoration of Peace, Balochistan). Sectarian violence orchestrated by Islamabad-backed Islamist formations is also responsible for a significant proportion of civilian fatalities.

Table 1: Annual Fatalities in Balochistan, 2004-2013

Years	Civilians	Security Forces	Terrorists	Total
2004	67	21	2	90
2005	71	14	28	113
2006	226	82	142	450
2007	124	27	94	245
2008	130	111	107	348
2009	152	88	37	277
2010	274	59	14	347
2011	542	122	47	711
2012	690	178	86	954
2013	130	13	1	144
Total*	2406	715	558	3679

Source 1: SATP, *Data till January 13, 2013

In comparison to 2011, when the Province witnessed 58 major incidents of killing (each involving three or more fatalities), 70 such incidents were recorded in 2012. In one such attack, on December 30, 2012, a car bomb exploded near a convoy of buses taking Shia pilgrims to Iran, on the RCD Highway in the Dringer area of the Mastung District of Balochistan, killing 20 persons and injuring 25 others.

The number of suicide attacks remained comparable between 2011 and 2012, though the resultant fatalities have almost halved – 60 fatalities in four attacks in 2011 as against 30 fatalities in three incidents in 2012. On the contrary, though the Province witnessed fewer bomb blasts, 148 in 2012 as compared to 194 in 2011, the resultant fatalities increased to 205 in 2012 as against 181 in 2011.

In 2012 there were fewer attacks on NATO convoys, though this was principally the consequence of the fact that the route through Chaman (Balochistan) and Khyber Pass [Khyber Agency in Federally Administered Tribal areas (FATA)] was closed for over six months, after the NATO attack on the Salala Check Post in the Mohmand Agency, FATA, on November 26, 2011, which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. It was only after the United States ‘apologized’ for the attack that Pakistan ordered its customs authorities, on July 4, 2012, to reopen the supply routes to NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan, through the Chaman border. While the Province

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witnessed 59 attacks on NATO convoys in 2011, with 19 killings and 20 injuries, 2012 recorded just 10 such attacks, resulting in six persons injured. However, in the latest of such attacks, two drivers were killed and 10 NATO containers were damaged when several rockets were fired on a terminal near Hazarganji on the outskirts of Quetta, in the night of January 11, 2013.

Given the state of Governance, acts of violence were, crucially, not restricted to a few areas, but occurred in practically each one of the 26 Districts of the Province, including the capital, Quetta. Quetta bore the brunt of terrorism through year, with 289 terrorism-related incidents, including all the three suicide attacks that took place in Balochistan. Out of the 148 bomb blasts recorded, 49 were reported in Quetta. The provincial capital also accounted for 50 incidents of sectarian violence.

The number of security forces personnel killed rose from 59 in 2010, to 122 in 2011, and further to 178 in 2012. In the deadliest of such attacks, on February 1, 2012, at least 15 personnel of the FC were killed and 12 were injured when militants belonging to the BLA attacked four FC check posts near the Margat coalmines in the Mach area of Bolan District. A BLA spokesperson, who introduced himself as Mirak Baloch, stated, "It is a reaction to the January 31, 2011, killings of granddaughter and great-grand-daughter of Nawab Akbar Bugti in Karachi." The Federal Ministry of Interior, on August 9, 2012, claimed that around 14 militant outfits, including BRA, Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), BLA and LJ, were operating in the Province. Interestingly, there was no mention of any Taliban formation or Al-Qaida.

As in previous years, rising extremism and violence have repeatedly demonstrated the presence of the Quetta Shura and Al-Qaida networks in North Balochistan. Since 2009, at least 22 Al-Qaida and two Afghan Taliban militants have been arrested in the region. The then-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) General David Petraeus, on February 2, 2012, had emphasized that the US needed to be cautious on Pakistan's ability and willingness to "go after" the Haqqani Network and those Taliban leaders present in Balochistan, known as the Quetta Shura. The Pakistan establishment, however, continues to brazenly deny this reality.

Meanwhile, the much publicized Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan (Initiation of the rights of Balochistan) package – which was approved by Pakistan's Parliament on November 23, 2009, acknowledging the widespread deprivation and neglect that prevailed in the Province and set a three-year implementation deadline – has expectedly failed to deliver. Though Parliamentary Secretary Khurram Jahangir Watto, on October 5, 2012, claimed that 42 of its 61 points had already been implemented, there has, in fact, been little progress on the issue of provincial autonomy, which according to the package, should have been immediately addressed. Though a parliamentary committee to look into the proposals and recommendations regarding provincial autonomy has been formed, the committee is yet to reach to any conclusion. Similarly, the proposal regarding initiation of a political dialogue with all major stakeholders in the political spectrum, to bring them into the mainstream politics has not been met, as Government failed to inspire trust in the Baloch nationalist groups. The Government is yet to release political prisoners, another proposal in the package. While a range of financial elements in the package have been announced, implementation on the ground remains, at best, marginal.

Anger among Baloch nationals continues to mount, both as a result of the continuing neglect of the province and the relentless campaign of 'disappearances' inflicted on dissidents by the

state's Forces and covert agencies. Through the year, the rebels continued to carry out attacks overwhelmingly targeting the economic infrastructure in the province, mainly gas pipelines, power pylons and railway tracks. The attacks remained principally non-lethal in intent. There were no deaths in 24 such incidents recorded through 2012. According to partial data compiled by SATP, there have been at least 194 incidents of sabotaging of gas pipelines since 2004.

The security forces remain preoccupied with their "kill and dump" operations, while Islamabad continues to ignore the ground reality in the Province. The crisis continues to deepen, with Islamabad sustaining groups of Islamist and sectarian extremists, even as it seeks to crush the groups agitating to draw attention to the legitimate demands and genuine grievances of the people of Balochistan.

FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA)

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader Maulvi Nazir was among 10 militants killed in a US-operated drone strike in the South Waziristan Agency (SWA) of the FATA on January 3, 2013. The drone targeted the Taliban leader's moving convoy while it was on its way to Wana, the SWA's headquarter, from Birmal tehsil (revenue unit). The hit occurred in Sarkundi area (in Birmal tehsil). Maulvi Nazir's key aide Rata Khan was among the militants killed. Maulvi Nazir was the second top TTP leader to be killed in a drone strike after Baitullah Mehsud, who was the chief of TTP when he was killed in 2009. Bahawal Khan's alias Salahuddin Ayubi has been named the new chief of the outfit.

Maulvi Nazir had earned notoriety in the spring of 2007 when he led a successful uprising against foreign militants in the Ahmedzai Wazir-held areas, ousting Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan militants, then led by Tahir Uldashev, along with their local supporters. Immediately thereafter, Nazir's group entered into a peace agreement with the Government, avoided attacking Government and Security Forces' (SFs) installations in the tribal region, and cooperated with the local administration. The military is believed to have struck a non-aggression pact with Nazir ahead of its 2009 operation against extremists in SWA. Moreover, Nazir was understood to be close to the Al-Qaida-linked, though Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) backed, Haqqani Network. Nazir had property in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and was earlier a member of the Hizb-i-Islami, an Afghan terrorist formation. He survived a suicide bombing in November 29, 2012. On December 4, 2012, he ordered all Mehsud tribesmen, including loyalists of the rival TTP led by Hakimullah Mehsud, to leave Wana, by December 5, 2012, presumably blaming them for the attack, though TTP (Hakimullah Mehsud) 'spokesman' Ehsanullah Ehsan announced that his group had nothing to do with the attack. A grand jirga (tribal assembly) of the Nazir group, a 120-member peace committee formed in 2007 representing the Ahmedzai Wazir clan and the elders of all nine Ahmedzai tribes and their sub-tribes, warned all internally displaced Mehsud tribesmen who had taken refuge from fighting in the Mehsud area between security forces and militants, to vacate their homes in the Ahmedzai Wazir area. Tribesmen loyal to Mullah Nazir subsequently extended the December 5, 2012, deadline by 10 days, following a second jirga meeting.

Meanwhile, in a bomb blast allegedly orchestrated by the Nazir group, pro-Uzbek TTP 'commander' Maulvi Abbas was killed on December 21, 2012, along with three others, in Wana.

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Sources said that a bomb went off at the office of Abbas' brother in the vegetable market, killing Abbas and two others, including his son. Another four people sustained injuries. Maulvi Abbas had recently been allowed to resettle in the Ahmedzai Wazir areas after he was expelled in a popular uprising led by Maulvi Nazir, in spring 2007. Senior TTP 'commander' Nek Muhammad, who was killed in a US drone strike in 2004, and Abbas, had come under sharp criticism in the past for harboring Uzbek, Tajik and other Central Asian militants. Abbas and his fighters left SWA after Maulvi Nazir became 'commander' of the terrorists in the region and launched a campaign against them for harboring the foreigners.

As in previous year, violence continues wrack the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, though a marginal dip in fatalities was registered, in the country's most volatile region. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), FATA registered a four per cent decline in overall terrorism-related fatalities, from 3,034 in 2011 to 2,901 in 2012. However, fatalities among civilians (549) and security forces (306), remained very high, increasing by 12.5 and 31.33 per cent, respectively. Terrorist fatalities declined from 2,313 in 2011, to 2,046 in 2012, principally due to the suspension of Army operations in many areas. Progressive suspension of military operations also resulted in a marginal decline in the major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities). A total of 261 major incidents were recorded in 2012, as against 281 in 2011.

Table 2: Fatalities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 2009-2013

Years	Civilians	SFs	Militants	Total
2009	636	350	4252	5238
2010	540	262	4519	5321
2011	488	233	2313	3034
2012	549	306	2046	2901
2013	12	0	72	84
Total*	2225	1151	13202	16578

Source 2: SATP, *Data till January 6, 2013

Another indicator of the region's rising volatility was the spike in bomb blasts and resultant fatalities. In comparison to 203 fatalities in 185 bomb blasts in 2011, year 2012 recorded 441 fatalities in 297 bomb blasts. Similarly, fatalities in suicide attacks increased to 151 in 10 incidents in 2012, as against 77 fatalities in eight such incidents in 2011.

The most significant suicide attacks in FATA in 2012 were:

- September 10: At least 15 Shias were killed and another 40 were injured in a suspected sectarian suicide attack in the crowded Hamid Market in the Kashmir Chowk area of Parachinar town, headquarter of the Kurram Agency.
- May 4: A suicide attack targeting security forces killed at least 29 persons, including four Policemen, and injured more than 73, at Khar Bazaar in the Khar town of Bajaur Agency.
- March 2: 23 people were killed and another 18 injured in a suicide attack targeting a mosque after Friday prayers in Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency.

- **February 17:** At least 43 Shias were reportedly killed, and another 21 were injured, after a suicide bomber detonated his explosives just near the targeted mosque in Kurmi Bazaar, Parachinar, the main town of Kurram Agency.

With all the seven agencies facing the brunt of militancy, the Khyber Agency has recorded the highest number of subversive acts during 2012, as compared to other parts of FATA. The data compiled by the offices of the Political Administrator in FATA records a total of 96 bomb blasts, suicide and rocket attacks in Khyber Agency between January and October of 2012. The volatile Agency has also topped the list of abduction-for-ransom incidents among all tribal units, with 40 recorded cases (only a fraction of such cases are reported). The main militant groups operating in the area include the Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), Tawheed-e-Islam (TI), Ansarul Islam (AI), Haji Namdar group and Abdullah Azzam Brigade.

Sectarian violence, which has been a persistent trend in FATA, saw an augmentation in 2012. In addition to the Kurram Agency, the only tribal agency with a significant Shia population, agencies such as Orakzai and Bajaur also witnessed sectarian attacks in 2012. While 2011 saw only three incidents of sectarian violence, with 27 killed and 26 injured, 2012 recorded eight incidents with 75 fatalities and 103 injured. The worst of these incidents was the February 17 suicide bombing near the Imambargah (Shia place of worship) in the Kurmi bazaar of Parachinar, which killed 43 Shias and injured 21 others. The Fazal Saeed Haqqani-led Tehreek-e-Taliban Islami (TTI) – a breakaway faction of the TTP – claimed responsibility for the attack.

Meanwhile, the emboldened militants escalated attacks on security forces and security post throughout the region. There were 13 incidents of terrorists targeting security force camps in 2012. In the latest of such attacks, more than 400 TTP militants stormed security checkpoints in Frontier Region Peshawar in FATA late in the night of December 26, 2012, killing two Levies personnel and abducting 22 others. On December 29, the 22 abducted Levies personnel were executed.

In the absence of military operations in the region, US drone operations continued to target top ranking terrorists, especially in North Waziristan Agency (NWA), despite severe criticism from both within and outside Pakistan. According to the SATP database, at least 344 terrorists were killed in 46 drone strikes in 2012 in the region, as compared to 548 terrorists in 59 such attacks in 2011. Some top terrorists terminated in drone strikes in 2012 included:

- **October 11:** TTP's Punjab chapter 'commander' Umar Haqqani and Maulvi Shakirullah were among 18 militants killed in a US drone attack at a militant compound in the Baland Khel area of Orakzai Agency. The building belonged to Maulvi Shakirullah, a 'commander' of the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group.
- **September 24:** Seleh al-Turki, a mid-level Al-Qaida operative and Abu Akash al-Iraqi, a senior Al-Qaida operative, were among eight terrorists killed when a US drone fired missiles on a house near Khaisura road in the Mir Ali subdivision of NWA.
- **June 4:** Abu Yahya al-Libi, the 'second-in-command' of the Al-Qaida, was killed in Hisokhel, in the east of Miranshah, in NWA. Another 14 terrorists were killed in the attack.

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- February 9: Badr Mansoor, a Pakistani citizen who served as Al-Qaida's Pakistan chapter 'commander' and a key link to the Taliban and Pakistani jihadi groups, was killed near Miranshah.

The success of US drone attacks in eliminating top leadership figures of terrorist formations located in NWA underlines the fact that the Agency remains a terrorist citadel and urgently needs to be sanitized. Islamabad, however, has demonstrated no inclination to take on the terrorist groups concentrated in the region. Indeed, despite an assurance by the Federal Minister of Interior, Rehman Malik, on October 12, 2012, after the Taliban attack on Malala Yusufzai on October 9, that, "if needed" operations would be launched in NWA after a decision "by political and military leadership of the country in harmony," the Government failed to move resolution on military operation in NWA in National Assembly on October 18. Indeed, Islamabad's inconsistent and opportunistic approach to Islamist terrorist groupings – some of which it continues to support in order to further its expansionist ambitions as well as for domestic political management – remains the principal cause of terrorism within the country. The internal damage inflicted by the terrorists appears, within the calculus of the country's military and political leadership, an acceptable price to pay for the potential strategic advantages that the sponsorship of terrorism is expected to yield.

SIPAHI-E-SAHABA

INTRODUCTION

The Sipahi-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) is an Islamic extremist group, subscribing to the Sunni sectarian belief that has engaged in terrorist violence across Pakistan. The main focus of their attacks has been the Shia Muslim community in Pakistan, which is approximately 20-30% of the population. In a startling development, SSP has made attempts to brand itself as a legitimate political party by speaking out against various election outcomes in Pakistan. An SSP leader was a minister in a Coalition Government in the Punjab Province of Pakistan in 1993. Later, however, in 2002, President Musharraf banned the organization. In response, the group appears to have begun operating under the alias "Millat Islamia".

HISTORY

The SSP organization was created in 1985 and is well rooted in the feudal set-up and politico-religious developments in the Punjab Province in Pakistan in the 1970's and 1980's. It was established against the backdrop of rising sectarian tension and aggression in the Punjab province of Pakistan. Economic and Political power in Pakistani Punjab was an opportunity only available to large landowners, which were mostly of the Shia Muslim sect, a relatively smaller group in comparison to the Sunni Muslims in the region. The urban areas in Punjab were, in contrast, a non-feudalized middle-class society, largely populated by Sunnis. The organization was set up by a number of Sunni religious leaders (Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Maulana Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi, Maulana Eesar-ul-Haq Qasmi and Maulana Azam Tariq) as the Anjuman Sipahi-e-Sahaba in September 1985. Many assert that the SSP was created at the request of the government of General Zia-ul-Haq in an attempt to establish an extremist Islamic opposition to pro-democracy groups opposed to military dictatorship.

The SSP created its headquarters in the city of Jhang, a location that divides central from the southern areas of the Punjab Province in Pakistan. Historically, economic and political power in this feudal system was dominated by the Shia landowners. However, as the area began to develop and become more important for merchants and shopkeepers (mostly Sunni), this new class began to seek political power and challenge the feudal system in place. Through the creation of the SSP, this challenge took the form of sectarian violence and terrorism. The creation of the SSP shifted the contest over political and economic power from one based on class to a violent sectarian and religious confrontation against the Shia minority.

A paradoxical situation has arisen. Many merchants continue to financially support SSP in the Jhang region; however the majority is opposed to the violence espoused by the group. Unfortunately, they are now caught in a precarious situation, as failure to continue funding would likely earn the wrath of the SSP.

IDEOLOGY

The SSP ideology is centered on sectarian division and violence. Amongst the organization's stated goals is to declare Pakistan a Sunni state, restricting the rights of Shia Muslims to practice their faith. SSP leaders have openly declared that the Shias are not to be considered as Muslims. At the outset, the SSP was created as a reaction to the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and as a counterforce to alleged increase in Shia political power in Pakistan. Maulana Zia-ul-Qasmi, a leading SSP leader, said in a January 1998 interview, "The government gives too much importance to the Shias. They are everywhere, on television, radio, in newspapers and in senior positions. This causes heartburn." The SSP hostility towards Shia Muslims is evident through the organization's ideology and goals.

While fanatical in its belief of hostility towards the Shia, the SSP also aims at restoring the Khilafat (Caliphate) system of the 7th century. It also alleges that its aim is to protect the Sunnis and their Sharia (religious law).

The SSP has also been actively opposed to the US-Pakistan alliance formed in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001. The alliance was targeted against the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan, a major supporter of Sunni extremists and terrorist organizations in Pakistan. The organization joined a number of other extremist organizations in forming the Afghan Jihad Council and claiming that US action was not a war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Instead, they asserted that the actions of the United States constituted a war against all of Islam, and therefore, it was essential for the Muslims to declare a type of war against the United States and its allies.

LEADERSHIP

Maulana Azam Tariq, the leader of SSP and a Member of the National Assembly of Pakistan, was assassinated by unidentified gunmen in the capitol city of Islamabad in October of 2003. A seminary educated religious figure, he achieved victory in the National Assembly elections of Jhang in October 2002, running as an independent candidate. Despite halfhearted claims that SSP maintained no links with any active terrorist groups, he personally was a frequent visitor to Afghanistan during the Taliban militia's rule. Most commentators identify SSP and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) as being closely linked.

During an international Difah-e-Sahaba conference being held in Karachi in 2000, Tariq declared that the SSP aims to transform more than two dozen of Pakistan's largest cities into "model Islamic cities" wherein many forms of media, such as television, cinema and music would be entirely forbidden. Furthermore, Tariq proudly declared his support for terrorist violence in the Jammu state of India, as well as Kashmir. After Maulana Masood Azhar was released from five years of imprisonment in Kandahar, Afghanistan and he formed the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) Azam Tariq reportedly pledged to send 500,000 Jihadis to Jammu and Kashmir to fight Indian security forces.

Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, another of the founding members of Sipah e Sahaba was killed in February of 1990. At the time of his death, he was publicly affiliated with SSP as a prominent

leader. He claimed to belong to the Deobandi sect, and many considered him to be quite popular in Jhang, however was not able to achieve a seat in the National Assembly elections of 1990. Haq Nawaz's main mission was to declare Pakistan a Sunni state and declare Shias as non-Muslims. In reaching this goal, he publicly ordered his militants to destroy peace in Pakistan if it became necessary to have Shias declared as non-Muslims. After the assassination of Maulana Jhangvi, Maulana Zia-ur Rehman Farooqi became the leader of the organization. Furthering the string of violence, Farooqi was later killed in a bomb explosion in the Lahore Sessions Court 1997. Thereafter, Maulana Azam Tariq succeeded Maulana Zia-ur Rehman Farooqi.

Other important SSP figures include: Allama Ali Sher Ghazni, the Patron-in-Chief of the organization; Maulana Zia-ul-Qasmi, Chairman of the SSP Supreme Council; Qazi Mohammed Ahmed Rashidi; Mohammed Yousuf Mujahid; Tariq Madni; Muhammad Tayyab Qasim; and Maulana Muhammad Ahmad Ludhianvi.

The SSP is believed to have 3,000 – 6,000 trained militant extremists, carrying out various kinds of violent sectarian activities primarily directed against the Shias.

ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS

The SSP's main method of operation has been through targeting centers of worship and prominent opponents. There have also been incidents of attacks on other targets such as Pakistani security forces. In 1992, SSP operatives were well known to engage in rocket launcher attacks, in one incident killing at least five police officers. 1994 in Punjab presented an abominable situation where in such incidents claimed at least 73 lives and injured more than 300 others. Many of these killings were the result of indiscriminate firing on people performing Islamic prayers inside mosques and prayer halls.

In 1996, the organization verbally stated their intention to join peace oriented efforts begun by the Milli Yakjeheti Council, however terrorist attacks and other violence did not lessen. Throughout 1996, the total number of attacks decreased. Sadly, however, the number of total fatalities increased, showing a growing level of strategy and preparation in terrorist efforts. According to the SATP, "In one such instance where SSP was suspected as the perpetrator, ten persons were killed in indiscriminate firing at a mourning procession in July 1996."

Various media reports show that SSP believes that the government of Iran is involved with rival Shia groups based in Pakistan. Accordingly, whenever any SSP official faces an untimely death, the organization immediately targets Iranians located in Pakistan for revenge. In one instance, the Iranian Counsel General in Lahore, Sadeq Ganji, was killed in December 1990 in what SSP declared to be revenge for the February 1990 killing of the SSP co-founder Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. No evidence was presented by SSP, and indeed the organization likely was unconcerned with providing such information, as anti-Shia activities are a staple of SSP. In 1997, another attack hit the Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore wherein terrorists set the building ablaze. Earlier in the year, Pakistan witnessed a bomb blast at the Sessions Court in Lahore, leaving dozens dead, including the then SSP chief Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi along with nearly two dozen policemen and a journalist.

SIPAHI-E-SAHABA

The SSP has chosen to lay low after the military coup of November 1999, as have other sectarian organizations in Pakistan. With the tough stance that the military regime took against internal violence and terrorist activities, sectarian organizations have chosen to keep a low profile. This lends credence to the hypothesis that SSP like other sectarian and ethnic groups, indulge in violence only when a passive state guarantees an environment of neutrality and even tacit support to this violence.

The SSP had also, according to SATP, “joined other members of the Afghan Jihad Council on September 20, 2001 in announcing a jihad against the US forces” as part of its opposition to the US-Pakistan alliance against the former Taliban regime. The SSP leadership criticized the Pakistani Government’s decision extending support to the US-led air attacks on the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and indicated that they would fight alongside the Taliban militia against the US.

Towns like Sargodha, Bahawalpur, Jhang, Multan and Muzaffargarh are SSP strongholds. The dynamic leadership of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi is reported to have popularized an anti-Shia campaign in southern and western areas of the Punjab Province in Pakistan, main centers of Shia populations.

The SSP has influence in all the four provinces of Pakistan and is considered to be the most powerful extremist group in the country. It has also succeeded in creating a political base and constituency in Pakistani Punjab and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The SSP has reportedly 500 offices and branches in all 34 districts of the Punjab Province in Pakistan. It is also reported to have approximately 100,000 registered workers in Pakistan and 17 branches in foreign countries including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Canada, and England.

FUNDING AND RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

In 1996, internal disputes erupted within the SSP over what the most radical wing of the organization termed as the ‘moderating nature’ of the organization. The dispute ended in the more radical and extreme elements walking out and creating the organization Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ). The SSP continued to maintain its political profile, participating in elections and in local coalition governments. Despite SSP denials, the LJ is widely considered to be the armed wing of the Sipahi-e-Sahaba.

The SSP draws support, inspiration and assistance from various political parties in Pakistan, primarily the Jamaat-e-Islam (Jel) and the Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam (Jul). The Jul is associated with running a large number of madrassas (seminaries) all over Pakistan from where recruits for the HuM, SSP and Taliban are provided. Many SSP operatives have received arms training from the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The SSP is also reported to be closely linked to the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a Pakistan-based terrorist organization active in Jammu and Kashmir. Maulana Masood Azhar, JeM chief, speaking at a Jihad conference in October 2000 said; “now we go, hand-in-hand with Sipahi-e-Sahaba, and stand shoulder to shoulder with Jaish-e-Muhammad in Jihad.”

The SSP has also been linked to Ramzi Ahmed Yousuf, an accused in the New York World Trade Center bombing of February 1993, who was later captured by the US authorities in February 1995.

The SSP also accepts major funding from anonymous sources in Saudi Arabia. Funds are also acquired from various sources, including monies labeled as Zakat donations from various Sunni extremist groups within Pakistan. SATP reports that "other sources include donations through local Sunni Organizations and trusts, madrassas and study circles, and contributions by political groups. Most of the foreign funded Sunni madrassas in Pakistan are reportedly controlled by the SSP."

LASHKAR I JHANGVI

INTRODUCTION & FORMATION

Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) formed in 1996 by a breakaway group of radical sectarian extremists of the Sipahi-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The group accused the parent organization of deviating from the ideals of its founders by becoming too moderate. The organization derives its name from one of the SSP founders, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, and was formed under the leadership of Akram Lahori and Riaz Basra. The main goal of the LJ is to transform Pakistan into an extremist Sunni state, almost primarily through violent means, although currently members of the organization are seeking political office to further their goals. On August 14, 2001, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan declared the group as a terrorist organization.

LEADERSHIP

In 1996, Muhammad Ajmal (operating under the alias Akram Lahori), Malik Ishaque, and Riaz Basra broke away from the SSP and founded the LJ, with a main objective of creating a Sunni state within Pakistan. Akram Lahori is currently the Saalar-i-Aala ('Commander-in-Chief') of the LJ. The group began its terrorist activities in the Pakistani province of Punjab and has established a terrorist training facility in Sarobi, Afghanistan after he obtained the permission and support of the Taliban.

Lahori succeeded as Commander-in-Chief of the LJ after the death of Riaz Basra, who was killed in Multan in 2002. Lahori has been in police custody since his arrest in Orangi Town, Karachi which occurred nearly a month after the death in Basra in 2002. At his arrest, a senior member of the LJ, Naeem Bukhari, released a press statement stressing that notion that Lahori might be killed in some sort of conspiracy. Bukhari was also arrested from his base of operations in Gulistan-i-Jauhar, Karachi. Bukhari was reportedly involved in the abduction and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl. It is unclear whether Lahori has passed on leadership of the organization to anyone else, or if continues to head the organization while being in detention.

In 2002, Police Officials indicated that Lahori was personally was involved in nearly 40 attacks resulting in sectarian killings in the Sindh province. According to SATP, Lahori reportedly confessed during interrogation that he was involved in 30 cases of sectarian killings in the Punjab Province in Pakistan, including those of 24 persons who were attending a Shia religious assembly (Majlis) in Mominpura. Following the death of previous leader Riaz Basra, it is reported that Lahori served as the LJ chief and personally planned, organized, and executed sectarian killings in Karachi more than a year.

Riaz Basra was also very involved in the LJ's violent activities. Basra was involved in more than 300 terrorist incidents and targeting government officials. He was arrested and tried by a special court for Ganji's killing, but escaped from police custody during his trial in 1994. He was Chief of the Khalid bin Walid unit of the Afghan Mujahideen, a Taliban affiliated group, in Afghanistan.

LASHKAR I JHANGVI

Basra is described as a true fanatic with a disturbing proclivity towards violence. Inspired by SSP, he became an assembly candidate in Lahore's elections, officially as an SSP nominee. During Basra's reign, LJ "rose to become the most dreaded sectarian terrorist organization in Pakistan." The nature and ferocity of the threat was such that Nawaz Sharif, the current Prime Minister of Pakistan, stopped attending open courts during his previous term in the same office, after receiving a threatening letter by Basra. Finally Basra was killed in May of 2002, in a shootout with Pakistani security forces. The organization had suffered the loss of several of its top leaders and other cadres due to a crackdown initiated by the Nawaz Sharif Administration in 1998.

The entire leadership of the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi consists of militants who fought as "revolutionaries" against USSR forces in Afghanistan. A majority of its soldiers come from the numerous Sunni madrassas (seminaries) in Pakistan. Lashkar-i-Jhangvi is organized into small cells of approximately five to eight soldiers each, all of whom operate independently of the others, further underscoring the nature of this terrorist organization. Apparently, individual LJ cells do not have knowledge of the number of sister cells in existence, nor are they aware of members of other cells, or their leadership structures. After carrying out an attack, LJ cells often go into communication silence, and go underground, only to reunite at LJ terror camps to plan future operations.

According to reports, the LJ is operating as a number of loosely coordinated units, each operating in a specific part of the country. This is especially true in the Pakistani province of Punjab, where autonomous chiefs control their own units of the organization. Riaz Basra reportedly controlled the LJ's units in Lahore, Gujranwala, Rawalpindi and Sargodha. Another top LJ terrorist, Malik Ishaque, currently under detention, was the chief of the units in Faisalabad, Multan and Bahawalpur divisions and in Bhakkar district. The LJ's ability to carry out most of its terrorist operations is attributed to its multi-cellular structure, whereby the organization is divided into small groups that are not in constant contact with each other.

Pakistani intelligence reports state that there are approximately three hundred LJ terror cells active in the country. Most of the LJ's personnel originate from the numerous terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, where they coordinate, plan and launch terrorist attacks in Pakistan. News reports indicate that LJ is confident in their perpetual ability to create new cells, and believe that the group will never have a shortage of personnel, despite any losses they may suffer through violent skirmishes or arrests by the police. LJ has been perpetually generating new cells since September of 2001, the date of the attacks against the United States.

LJ's most important training camps are headquartered in Pakistan's Punjab Province. A third important terror camp is located in Afghanistan near Kabul. According to intelligence reports, a high ranking LJ official named Qari Asadullah has been in charge of the supervision and training of freshman terrorists, receiving guidance and assistance from Taliban forces. Lashkar-i-Jhangvi terrorist have acquired replicas of official police uniforms to help facilitate easy access to attack sites, and easy extraction after the attack has occurred.

The South Asian Terrorism Portal reports indicate that the occasional successes against the LJ by the security agencies have forced the top leadership to remain underground. Rather than

risk arrest by engaging in attacks themselves, they have begun training new recruits and directing operations.

FUNDING AND RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Despite the fact that SSP chief Maulana Azam Tariq often makes proclamations that SSP is unaffiliated with the terrorist activities of the LJ, security forces, news media, and intelligence agencies all report that LJ and SSP are closely interrelated, particularly as the former is a splinter group of the latter. For instance, SATP reports that when LJ terrorist Sheikh Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was due to be hanged in February 2001 for terrorist offences, Maulana Tariq, instead of dissociating himself from the terrorist, led a campaign for the remission of his sentence and also offered diyat (blood money) to Iran in an unsuccessful effort to stop the execution.

Both the SSP and LJ often attempt to assert that they are not linked, and such claims are often met with skepticism. National and international observers refuse to accept such assertions, as they are repeatedly and easily proven false in light of ongoing collaboration between the two groups. Their personnel come from the same madrassas and a similar social environment. The two organizations share the same sectarian belief system and worldview, and the SSP leadership has never criticized the Lashkar i Jhangvi's operations. They also have a similar charter of demands, which includes turning Pakistan into a Sunni state. Both the organizations have consistently resorted to violence and killings to press their demands, though the SSP has also been attempting to adopt a political profile.

The SSP and LJ maintain strong and friendly relationships with the Taliban, in particular its military components. SATP reports that they "have assisted the Taliban in every way they can both in Afghanistan and within Pakistan. They have fought alongside the Taliban militia in Afghanistan against the Northern Alliance. All three groups are closely linked in their fight against the Shias, be it in Afghanistan or in Pakistan. LJ and SSP personnel reportedly played an active part in the massacres of Shias by the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan."

Many LJ personnel were given sanctuary in Afghanistan by the Taliban, including former LJ chief Riaz Basra and current chief Akram Lahori. The Taliban leadership have denied requests to surrender nearly two dozen terrorists to Pakistan, saying the militants, belonging both to the SSP and the LJ, are fugitives from the law, and their whereabouts are unknown. Despite this proclamation, Pakistan has asserted that the terrorists continued to thrive in Taliban controlled Afghanistan, in its capitol, without any restriction. The whereabouts of these Afghanistan-based LJ terrorists after the US occupation of Afghanistan is unclear.

The LJ has secured considerable assistance from other Deobandi organizations, as it is a part of the broader Deobandi movement (a revivalist movement of Sunni Islam based mostly in Central Asia and that is shared by the LJ, SSP, Taliban, and other extremist organizations). It also has an effectual working relationship with other Deobandi political and terrorist organizations at a personal level, if not at the organizational level. In Afghanistan, they reportedly trained along with the Taliban and other Deobandi terrorists from Pakistan at the same training camps.

The LJ is also reported to have links with the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Pakistan-based terrorist organization active in India's Jammu and Kashmir. Many front ranking LJ terrorists have

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reportedly received training at HuM camps in Afghanistan. The LJ also maintains links with the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), another Pakistan-based terrorist organization.

Reports hold that the LJ has received significant funding from anonymous sources located in Saudi Arabia, just as the SSP does. Evidence proving this relationship was provided with the arrest of many LJ militants after the May 1997 assassinations of various officials and dignitaries. SATP reports that a substantial portion of the LJ's funding is reportedly derived from wealthy benefactors in Karachi, Pakistan.

ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS

The LJ's main terrorist headquarters are in Pakistan, where it has claimed responsibility for innumerable attacks against Shia Muslims, and targeted assassinations of Shia religious and community leaders. Upwards of 700 doctors, lawyers, teachers, religious scholars, students, politicians and other activists have been killed by LJ attacks in the period from 2008-2013. All of them were Shias.

The purpose of these attacks is to force the government of Pakistan to accept its extremist ideology as a form of government. The primary victims of LJ attacks are members of the Shia Muslim community, in particular popular Shia leaders, merchants, professionals, and anyone else in the public sector; however the group has no qualms about, and indeed boasts of attacking all adherents of the Shia faith. LJ is a tightknit group and maintains great secrecy in both its activities and organization. Despite openly claiming responsibility for a significant number of attacks, LJ members have never directly interacted with members of the media, instead relying upon third party communications or fax to relay messages.

In October 1997, a Pakistani news report quoted Malik Ishaque, a top LJ terrorist currently under detention, as saying, "I have been instrumental in the killing of 102 human beings." Ishaque has continued to proudly make such statements and is currently present in the public circles of Pakistan, apparently unafraid of security forces.

After a massacre against the Lahore Mominpura Cemetery in 1998 where a Shia funeral ceremony was attacked, resulting in significant deaths, two main LJ leaders were killed, and leaders Lahori and Rahman were captured. Following interrogations of the surviving leaders, security forces recovered more than a hundred Kalashnikov rifles, explosive bombs, chemical weapons, poisonous devices, and rockets from LJ bunkers.

SATP reports that Karachi Police on June 29 published photos of 10 terrorists wanted in connection with the murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl and for the two car-bomb attacks on Western targets in Karachi. In a major attack near the US Consulate in Karachi in 2000, a dozen individuals were killed by an attack perpetrated by LJ. SATP states that according to senior investigators, the Al-Qaida network is suspected to have worked with LJ personnel to plan both car-bomb attacks. Intelligence sources have indicated that certain LJ terrorists arrested in Karachi in June 2002 have been allegedly working with the Al-Qaida to strike at targets in Pakistan.

TEHREEK-E-TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP)

FORMATION

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), well known as the Pakistani Taliban, is one of the most dangerous of all the terror groups operating in Pakistan. TTP was founded after NATO operations in Afghanistan occurred, in response to 9/11. Responding to US intervention, a group of Afghani militants started the Pakistan Taliban in an effort to help their Afghani compatriots. Initially beginning as merely a sympathizing organization, they began terrorist activities of their own in 2007. That year, the organization officially announced itself, proclaiming Baitullah Mehsud as their leader. The newly formed TTP was a conglomerate of thirteen other terror groups who united to accomplish similar goals. Their organizational location is hidden in the South Waziristan Agency of the FATA region of Pakistan. The main goal of the united TTP is to oppose the United States and its allies in Afghanistan, and to attack and destroy Western targets in Pakistan.

The main goals of the TTP are to enforce extremist Salafist and Sunni ideology in Pakistan, to engage in attacks against NATO forces in Afghanistan, and to perform terrorism against the Pakistan Army. Among its other stated goals are to refuse future peace deals with the government of Pakistan.

ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS

TTP has members from all seven tribal regions, or 'agencies' of the FATA province, additionally obtaining members from throughout Pakistan. Intelligence estimates indicate that the group has approximately thirty thousand militants headquartered in South Waziristan. From its original inception, TTP has expanded its networks to all of Pakistan's provinces, and functions through the use of chapter leaders by local military commanders. Unlike SSP and its cells, TTP engages in heavy coordination between its various factions to facilitate attacks. Its attacks are primarily focused in Pakistan, but the group has been known to support Taliban forces across the border in Afghanistan in their attacks against US and NATO forces.

In a terrifying development, there is a high degree of overlap and collaboration between TTP and other terrorist groups, most notably SSP and LJ. While each group pursues its own individual agenda, there is obviously a high degree of similarity in their violent ideologies and goals, which allow the three groups to coordinate attacks and strategies. On November 23, 2008, the then TTP spokesman, Mullah Omer, openly admitted, "The Taliban are present in Karachi and have links with the LJ, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and other banned religious organizations." Apart from these sectarian groups, there are others with which the TTP has established links with, primarily including Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HuM), and Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI). SATP reports on January 5, 2011, indicated that five terrorist groups had joined the TTP and were working under its leadership.

FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION STATUS

The US Department of State added TTP as a banned Foreign Terrorist Organization more than a year before the 9/11 attacks. Following the US ban, England also designated TTP as a terrorist group and instituted efforts to cut off financial support for the organization. Canada followed suit a few months later. Vic Toews, Canada's Minister of Public Safety, noted that putting TTP on the terrorism blacklist was "an essential part of our efforts to combat terrorism and keep our communities safe." On July 29, 2011, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) put the TTP on its international anti-terrorism sanctions list in a move highlighting the growing threat from the outfit. The group was banned in Pakistan on August 25, 2008, yet continues to function without any major limitations, seemingly with impunity.

TERRORIST GROUPS

There are currently over 40 active terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan. Below is a listing of identified and active terrorist organizations within Pakistani territory.

DOMESTIC ORGANIZATIONS

1. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
2. Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)
3. Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO)
4. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
5. Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)
6. Jamaat-ul-Fuqra
7. Nadeem Commando
8. Popular Front for Armed Resistance
9. Muslim United Army
10. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Al-alami (HuMA)

TRANS-NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen(HM)
2. Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA, presently known as Harkat-ul Mujahideen)
3. Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT)
4. Jaish-e-Mohammad Mujahideen E-Tanzeem(JeM)
5. Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HuM, previously known as Harkat-ul-Ansar)
6. Al Badr
7. Jamait-ul-Mujahideen (JuM)
8. Lashkar-e-Jabbar (LJ)
9. Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HUJI)
10. Muttahida Jihad Council (MJC)
11. Al Barq
12. Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen
13. Al Jihad
14. Jammu & Kashir National Liberation Army
15. People's League
16. Muslim Janbaz Force
17. Kashmir Jihad Force
18. Al Jihad Force
19. Al Umar Mujahideen
20. Mahaz-e-Azadi
21. Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba
22. Jammu & Kashmir Students Liberation Front

TERRORIST GROUPS

23. Ikhwan-ul-Mujahideen
24. Islamic Students League
25. Tehrik-e-Hurriyat-e-Kashmir
26. Al Mustafa Liberation Fighters
27. Tehrik-e-Jihad-e-Islami
28. Muslim Mujahideen
29. Al Mujahid Force
30. Tehrik-e-Jihad
31. Islami Inquilabi Mahaz

ATTACKS ON WESTERN TARGETS IN PAKISTAN

No.	Date	Target	Incidents	Killed	Injured
1	Oct 28, 2001	Catholic Church, Bahawalpur	Police personnel and 17 Christians, including five children killed.	18	9
2	Jan 23, 2002	Karachi	US journalist Daniel Pearl abducted.	0	0
3	Mar 17, 2002	Protestant Church, Islamabad	Five persons killed.	5	40
4	May 8, 2002	Sheraton Hotel, Karachi	Nine French and five Pakistanis, including the suspected suicide bomber, killed.	15	34
5	June 14, 2002	US Consulate, Karachi	10 persons, including five women, killed.	10	51
6	July 13, 2002	Archaeological site, Mansehra	12 persons, including seven Germans, injured.	0	12
7	Aug 5, 2002	Christian Missionary School, Murree	Six Pakistanis killed	6	4
8	Aug 9, 2002	Mission Hospital, Taxila	Three women, terrorist killed.	4	24
9	Sept 25, 2002	Idara Amn-o-Insaaf (Institute for Peace and Justice), a Christian charity, Karachi.	Seven Christians killed and three others injured.	7	3
10	Dec 25, 2002	United Presbyterian Church near Sialkot, Punjab province.	Three women killed and 15 persons injured in a grenade attack.	3	15
11	Feb 28, 2003	United States Consulate in Karachi	Two policemen guarding the Consulate are killed and five others injured by an unidentified gunman.	2	5
12	May 15, 2003	21 British and US gas stations owned by Royal Dutch/Shell Group and Caltex	Five persons are injured during serial bomb blasts at 21 gas stations.	0	5
13	May 3, 2004	Chinese nationals working on a sea-port project in	Three Chinese engineers were killed and 11 persons, including 9	3	11

ATTACKS ON WESTERN TARGETS IN PAKISTAN

		Gwadar	Chinese nationals, sustain injuries in a car bomb attack.		
14	May 26, 2004	Pakistan-American Cultural Centre and residence of the US Consul-General in Karachi	Two persons are killed and at least 33 others, mostly police and media personnel, are wounded when two car bombs explode in succession.	2	33
15	Nov 15, 2005	KFC restaurant in Karachi	At least three people are killed and 20 others, including two South African women, sustain injuries in a powerful car bomb explosion in front of the KFC restaurant.	3	20
16	Mar 2, 2006	US Consulate in Karachi	A US diplomat, identified as David Fyfe, his Pakistani driver and a Rangers official were killed and 54 persons injured in a suicide car bombing near the US Consulate.	3	54
17	Mar 15, 2008	Luna Caprese restaurant in Islamabad	A bomb blast occurred at the Italian restaurant, killing a Turkish woman, Inder Baskar, who worked for a Turkish relief agency, and wounding about 15 other foreigners, including some US diplomats.	1	15
18	June 2, 2008	Danish embassy, Islamabad	A suspected suicide bomber blew up his car outside the Danish embassy, killing at least eight persons and injuring 30 others. The Danish Foreign minister said a Pakistani cleaner employed at the embassy and a Danish citizen of Pakistani origin had died and three other local employees were hurt, but the embassy's four Danish staffers were unharmed.	8	30
19	Aug 26, 2008	The US Consulate's Principal Officer	The US Consulate's Principal Officer Lynne	0	1

		Lynne Tracy	Tracy escaped a gun attack in Peshawar, capital of the North West Frontier Province. She was en route to the consulate situated on the Rehman Baba Road in a bullet-proof car when gunmen opened fire. Even as her car managed to speed away to safety, an auto-rickshaw driver was injured.		
20	Sept 28, 2008	Attock, Punjab	Unidentified militants abducted a Polish engineer, Poitr Stancza, near Attock in Punjab, shooting dead his two drivers and a security guard during the abduction.	3	0
21	Feb 2, 2009	Quetta, Balochistan	John Solecki, head of the UN High Commission for Refugees office, was abducted and his driver was killed after ambushing his vehicle.	1	0
22	Feb 8, 2009	Darra Adam Khel, NWFP	Taliban militants released a videotape showing the beheading of Polish geologist Poitr Stancza. Stancza was kidnapped in September 2008 when he was on a visit to his company's site in Attock in the Punjab province.	1	0
23	Mar 8, 2009	Angoor Adda area of South Waziristan, FATA	Taliban militants shot down a US drone	0	0
24	April 1, 2009	Gojaro Kalay emerald mine in Shangla District, NWFP	More than 70 Taliban militants attacked the famous Gojaro Kalay emerald mine and took control of the mining operations. The mine had been leased to American firm Luxury International	0	0
25	Feb 19, 2010	Shankai area of Qillah Saifullah	Four officials of Mercy Corps (MC), an	0	0

ATTACKS ON WESTERN TARGETS IN PAKISTAN

		District, Balochistan	international NGO, were abducted by unidentified militants		
26	Mar 10, 2010	Oghi village in Mansehra, NWFP	Six persons, including two women, were killed and seven others were injured when over a dozen militants attacked the office of World Vision International, a US-based Christian aid agency.	6	7
27	April 5, 2010	US Consulate in Peshawar	A series of three powerful blasts followed by heavy gunfight in a brazen suicide mission, apparently planned to target the US Consulate in Peshawar, left eight persons dead and 18 others injured in Peshawar.	10	18
28	September 3, 2012	University Town / Peshawar / KP	At least four persons, including two Americans, were reportedly killed and 19 others injured in when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden vehicle in the University Town area of Peshawar. Officials said the target of the bombing was apparently a vehicle in use by US nationals.	5	19
Total*				116	410

Source 2: <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/westerntargets.htm>

*Data till November 4, 2012

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